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PROTECTING THE MEDICAL RECORD IN THE COMPUTER AGE
Introduction
The medical record "may contain more intimate details about an
individual than could be found in any single document."' It is the pri-
mary source of information relating to every facet of health care, includ-
ing medical history, clinical treatment, and administrative and financial
resources.2 Proponents of a computerized medical record have always
been concerned with the problem of protecting sensitive patient informa-
tion from accidental or intentional disclosure.3 Many thoughtful ap-
proaches to protecting patient privacy have been explored in the past
twenty-five years. Nevertheless, the confidentiality of the computerized
medical record is not yet adequately protected.
The undefined scope of the constitutional right to privacy makes the
status of confidential information uncertain. Some commentators have
called for a lesser expectation of privacy in the medical record because of
society's interest in public health. The difficulty in balancing the confi-
dentiality of health care records with the public's interest in this data has
led to inconsistent holdings in state and federal courts. The leading deci-
sion in this realm, Whalen v. Roe,4 was decided two decades ago, and its
analysis of the security provisions in that case should no longer be ap-
plied to current computer technology. Federal statutes do not meet the
added burden technological development places on the security of gov-
ernment-controlled information. Not all states have laws pertaining to
patient access and privacy and those that exist are not uniform. Health
care regulatory agencies do not yet address the additional security
problems posed by the automation of the medical record. Technological
safeguards, although feasible, are time-consuming and expensive to
implement.
Additional controls are necessary to deal with the problems that are
exacerbated by automated collection of sensitive information. The likeli-
hood of increased government involvement in this country's health care
delivery system and the flow of medical data across state lines make a
1. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMA-
TION SOCIETY 282 (1977) [hereinafter PRIVACY STUDY] (quoting testimony from Medical
Records Hearings, June 10, 1976, at 137).
2. John D. Rootenberg, Computer-Based Patient Records: The Next Generation of
Medicine?, 267 JAMA 168 (1992).
3. See generally OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS
OF MEDICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 50-51 (1977) [hereinafter POLICY IMPLICATIONS];
EMANUEL HAYT, MEDICOLEGAL ASPECTS OF HOSPITAL RECORDS 185-87 (2d ed. 1977);
ROBERT D. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 295-96 (5th ed. 1986); Jo ANNE
CZECOWSKI BRUCE, PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH CARE INFORMATION
186-87 (2d ed. 1988).
4. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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closer look at computer technology imperative. Backed by regulatory
requirements, computer technology may be the only feasible way to pro-
tect the privacy interests threatened by the overwhelming growth of
health care information systems and the collection and dissemination of
information they engender. Courts must draw upon principles estab-
lished by data security experts and incorporate these principles in the
judicial test balancing private interest against public need.
This note considers the constitutional, judicial, and policy implica-
tions of the collection and automation of medical information. Part I
outlines the growth of computerized medical record systems and dis-
cusses the benefits of automated health care information and the likely
future direction of such systems' growth. Part II analyzes the existing
legal aspects of access to health care records, including the lack of con-
trols over automation in hospital licensing and accreditation, the owner-
ship of the medical record, and patient access rights. Part III discusses
the foundations of the privacy interest in the medical record and outlines
constitutional, legislative, and judicial responses on the state and federal
level. Part IV analyzes court decisions involving the release of computer-
ized medical data and proposes a standardized judicial analysis. Finally,
in Part V, this note reviews public policy considerations for the com-
puter-based medical record and suggests additional procedures that may
help protect confidential information from unwarranted public
disclosure.
I
The Growth of Computerized Medical Information Systems
In 1977, Alan Westin reported that "[i]n a few hundred situations,
doctors have moved beyond billing and into automation of patient
records .... Compared with the Jot-it-down'... method, legible only to
the doctor, automated records now produce detailed personal histories
that can be read by all the personnel in the office." 5 During the past
decade, health care providers have moved steadily toward the automa-
tion of the complete medical record. In recent years, the increased speed
and capacity of mainframe computers, together with the decreasing costs
of on-line storage devices,6 have made this feasible. The increased power
of the personal computer, the growth of networks, 7 and fourth-genera-
5. ALAN F. WESTIN, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NAT'L BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPE-
CIAL PUB. No. 469, A POLICY ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN RIGHTS ISSUES IN HEALTH DATA
SYSTEMS 14 (Florence Isbell ed., 1977).
6. Mass storage devices provide relatively large volume on-line storage, directly accessi-
ble to the central processing unit of a computer.
7. A network connects a number of computers for the purpose of sharing data.
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tion database retrieval tools' also have contributed to the proliferation of
medical software applications. These systems are designed to facilitate
the capture, storage, and retrieval of large amounts of patient data. They
range in size from a single doctor using a stand-alone personal computer
to enormous shared databanks whose boundaries span state lines.9 To-
day, modem health care institutions cannot function efficiently without
computers and information technology.' 0
Information systems implemented outside the clinical patient treat-
ment area include financial and administrative systems, accounting, pay-
roll, employee staffing and scheduling, purchasing and central supply,
patient billing and collection, patient identification and tracking, room
and bed management, discharge planning, risk management and infec-
tion control, quality assurance, dietary support, tracking of the paper
chart, operating room management, appointment scheduling, nursing
support, electronic mail systems, and expert systems to aid support of
medical decisions." Successful systems have been implemented for
many clinical departments including clinical laboratory, radiology, phar-
macy, cardiology/cardiac surgery, orthopedics, respiratory therapy, and
oncology. In many institutions, the speed and storage capacity of the
mainframe computers have been coupled with the flexible data retrieval
provided by personal computers. This allows health care professionals to
access and manipulate patient care data without the programming staff
typically required by a large facility's information services department.
With so much data already collected for each patient, efforts are
being made to capture and store large amounts of textual data, such as
physician reports. Unlike the results of tests and procedures that usually
can be stored numerically or in code, transcription reports require a tre-
mendous amount of storage space. Until recently, the cost of storage was
prohibitively expensive. Now, physicians, hospital administrators, and
national health care planners look forward to having a complete stan-
dardized medical record available on-line.12 For example, Kaiser
8. A database is a highly structured dataset organized for efficient retrieval and storage
of data on a random basis. This capability is obtained through a complex structure of refer-
ence tables and retrieval and storage programs in which data are stored so that they are in-
dependent of structured applications programs that must be written by computer
programmers. Many databases contain an ad hoc inquiry capability that enable the user to
perform flexible searches.
9. See, e.g., PRIVACY STUDY, supra note 1, at 282. The use of national telecommunica-
tions may establish a basis for federal jurisdiction over medical record access and disclosure.
10. William R. Hersh, Informatics: Development and Evaluation of Information Technol-
ogy in Medicine, 267 JAMA 167 (1992).
11. BERNIE MINARD, HEALTH CARE COMPUTER SYSTEMS FOR THE 1990s 7-20 (1991).
12. In October 1991, the American Medical Record Association changed its name to the
American Health Information Management Association. The name change acknowledges the
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Permanente of Northern California, one of the largest health care provid-
ers in the state, is conducting a five-year plan to automate every member
patient's complete medical record, from doctor notes to prescriptions. 3
Once the records are automated, Kaiser physicians will be able to access
records from anywhere in the region, including their own homes. 
14
A. Benefits
The development of automated systems for storage and retrieval of
health care information has many beneficial aspects. Indeed, some sug-
gest automation actually improves the confidentiality of the medical rec-
ord.' 5 The goal of computerization is to enhance patient care by doctors
and support staff16 by providing them with more accurate, timely, legi-
ble, and complete medical records. 7 In addition, unlike the traditional
paper record, the computerized medical record can be made available to
more than one health care provider at a time.' 8
Computer systems can help a health care institution prevent the loss
and misuse of the medical record. 9 Paper records can be misplaced and
individual pages of the record substituted, corrected, or even destroyed.
With appropriate backup procedures, computer files can be restored in
the case of accidental erasure, viral infection, or other computer catastro-
phe. Intentional or inadvertent correction or deletion of individual files
can be traced or prohibited outright.2" In this way, computerized medi-
growing focus on information management, especially the computerization of health records.
HHS to Study National Computer Billing System, 46 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS'N. 7
(1992).
Also, the University of Sherbrooke, a Canadian medical school, will no longer permit any
handwriting in the medical records maintained at its teaching hospital after Fall 1992.
Rootenberg, supra note 2, at 168-69.
13. David Ansley, Kaiser strives to regain its edge, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 11,
1992, at IA, 26A.
14. Id.
15. MILLER, supra note 3, at 293. Miller argues that a "properly designed computer ac-
cess security system may provide more protection of confidentiality than traditional medical
records because: (1) there are few points of access to the computer; (2) it is possible to restrict
each person's access to a limited scope of information; and (3) it is possible to monitor continu-
ously or selectively the information being sought through individual access codes." Id.
16. HAYT, supra note 3, at 184-85.
17. POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 3, at 40-41.
18. Id. at 40.
19. WILLIAM H. ROACH, JR., ET AL., MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE LAW 108 (1985).
20. For example, once a record is complete and has been verified, a flag on the record can
be set that prohibits additional modifications. Many systems will have a security override with
highly restricted access to enable only one person (the Director of Medical Records, for exam-
ple) to correct a completed record. Alternatively, corrections can be completed, but each mod-
ification (usually of designated fields such as diagnoses but not home address) will result in a
complete record being written. The user can then "page" through the on-line panels to get a
complete history of the patient record. There is less chance, therefore, that a medical practi-
[V/ol. 15:455
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cal records systems can help a hospital meet its affirmative duty to exer-
cise reasonable care in maintaining medical records.21
In addition, automation of patient care data may aid planning and
research activities, such as resource allocation and institutional plan-
ning.12 Some even speculate that malpractice litigation will decrease be-
cause accurate medical records tend to reduce errors in patient care.23
Specific applications can be developed to enhance communication be-
tween the patient and physician, particularly in situations in which the
physician must sift through large volumes of data.24 The release of per-
sonal medical data to researchers engaged in epidemiological and clinical
research has provided the basis for many advances in modem medicine.
Automated databases also save lives-as in the case of national trans-
plant registries that track thousands of potential recipients and match
possible donors in an extremely sensitive time frame.
One can envision specific applications in which an automated medi-
cal record would be of great convenience to many members of society.
For example, a centralized database of childhood immunization records
accessible by public school admissions personnel would save untold
hours spent by parents looking for lost immunization records and by
health care personnel duplicating records by hand. In such a system, a
patient (or parent) should have the option to refuse to allow access. This
could be done by placing a flag on the record which would not permit it
to be displayed when an inquiry is made. Each school should be given a
unique identifier to access the system and the inquiries should be tracked.
Other simple systems could be developed such as standardizing and auto-
mating one's health history. Small annoyances such as having to fill out
a new form every time a new physician is seen could be eliminated and a
tioner faced with a malpractice claim can "doctor" medical record information protected by
adequate programming safeguards.
21. Fox v. Cohen, 406 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. 1980) (a hospital owes a duty to its patients
to exercise reasonable care in maintaining medical records). See also infra notes 74-75 and
accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., ROACH ET AL., supra note 19, at 48-50 (importance of adequate documenta-
tion in medical cases).
23. Id. at 45.
24. For example, one health care institution in California paid large settlements to two
patients, one whose lab results had been lost, and one who had not been notified of an adverse
lab result. In response, the institution implemented a software system to automatically capture
from the laboratory system specified results of certain lab tests done on a large-scale basis
(such as pap smears). The physician and her staff can access these results both by the tradi-
tional paper method and also by on-line computer inquiry. By entering a code and the physi-
cian number, they can gain instant access to the records of their patients who have had adverse
lab results. The physician is required to notify the patient and to document on the computer
all attempts at notification and the response. Once in the system, a series of paper reports is
generated and sent to the Quality Assurance staff. Quality Assurance then monitors timely
and appropriate physician response. The author designed one such system.
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more complete record maintained, one not dependent on the memory or
patience of the patient.
B. Current Use and Abuse
Abuse of the confidentiality of the computerized medical record is of
great concern to health care administrators and data processing person-
nel. Automation, in general, encourages the collection of more informa-
tion, the exchange of more data, and the extension of access to more
people. Safeguarding data security is a major problem: "[S]ince there
are more points of access, there must be more sophisticated surveillance
than that which existed before the proliferation of computers and accom-
panying technology."25
Computing systems vary widely from one health care institution to
another. Although decentralized networked systems allow the individual
department to select hardware and software suitable to its needs, 26 many
large institutions still rely on a centralized mainframe system supporting
a number of terminals with on-line27 access to medical data. Each com-
puter user is given his own log-on identification and password to the sys-
tem. These are entered into a security table maintained by the data
processing department. 2' This security file contains the access codes to
the on-line panels that display patient information. Thus, security is
both user-specific and function-specific.29
Such security systems are often undercut, however, by multiple
users of one terminal. Because of the time delay in signing on and enter-
25. Marc D. Hiller & Vivian Beyda, Computers, Medical Records and the Right to Pri-
vacy, 6 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 463, 484 (1981).
26. The growth of computerized medical systems in this area has been tremendous in the
past few years because of the falling costs of the personal computer, technological advances in
networking, and the enormous financial overhead as well as the programming inflexibility of
the traditional mainframe system.
27. On-line processing is interactive and has been characterized as a "conversation" be-
tween the computer and the user. The information entered by the user is processed immedi-
ately, and the computer can be programmed to "respond" depending on the data entered.
28. This is a description of the security system of CICS, a language used for on-line
programming.
29. For example, to access clinical lab results after signing on with the correct log-on
identifier and personal password, the computer end-user enters a four-letter code and the pa-
tient medical record number. If the end-user's security file permits access to the lab panel, the
lab results panel will be displayed on the terminal. If access is not permitted, the end-user's
terminal will display a message that a security violation has occurred and that person's secur-
ity officer should be contacted. This information is recorded in the central system files and
identifies the terminal at which the violation occurred.
In many institutions, there is a security officer for each area who determines the level of
access required for each employee. Nurses, for example, have access to the clinical lab on-line
panels to retrieve lab results for their patients. Collections personnel would not have access to
lab results but could access other panels containing financial information and payment history.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 15:455
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ing the security passwords while focusing on patient care duties, one user
will often log on and gain access to a panel and allow other users to make
inquiries from her security level. Any additional security measures con-
templated by computer analysts must be evaluated in terms of time and
ease of application. If the security procedures are too burdensome, they
will be bypassed by the end-users because of the pressures inherent in a
responsive health care environment.
Some institutions allow users to download data from the mainframe
to a personal computer in order to take advantage of more flexible analy-
sis tools. In addition to hospital records, many physicians maintain their
own records on personal computers, often using systems of their own
design and development. Diskettes are quite portable and may be easily
transferred between personal computer users. Security policies of a
health care institution, even one with centralized computing services,
must extend to personal computers to be effective.
Another major problem is the possible inaccuracy of coded informa-
tion entered into the automated medical record system. Unlike a manual
system in which both a code and a description are noted, many software
systems use a code to pull the description from a master file. The code is
flagged as inaccurate only if it cannot be found. Codes can easily be
transposed. Patient medical record numbers also can be entered errone-
ously. Once this information has entered a computer system, it may be
difficult to correct because the data has been sent out to other computer
systems. A newspaper columnist found one such incident amusing:
Amos West of Walnut Creek rec'd a bill from the John Muir Medical
Center showing that he had both a vaginal and prostate examination,
which, he complains, "makes me a real freak." He is also exercised
because $967.25 of the $1,424.75 bill was promptly paid by Medicare.
The fact is that he was never in the hospital, which is claiming com-
puter error, of course, and says that Medicare has been reimbursed
30
But has his medical record been corrected? Generally, there is no
mechanism to correct computerized files containing the misinformation
that has been downloaded, transmitted, or mailed (on magnetic tape or
diskette) to other computer systems other than manually tracking down
all the recipients of the data. This problem can be better addressed in
two ways: (1) by implementing "smarter" software that would prevent
the error in the first place (for example, checking the diagnosis and pro-
cedure against the sex and age of the patient would be fairly simple to
implement); and (2) by automatically creating a record when data is
transferred from the computer system to any recipient.
30. Herb Caen, Poor Herbert's Almanac, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 5, 1992, at Dl.
1993]
Some types of medical information are deemed so sensitive that they
should not be accessible by computer. These include psychiatric evalua-
tions31 and AIDS testing results. a2 Other sensitive information has been
subject to abuse. One health care institution reported complaints about
employees looking up their coworkers' lab results before asking for social
dates.33 A hospital employee in Ohio was tried and acquitted after find-
ing "a friend's AIDS diagnosis in the hospital computer" and sharing it
with her fellow employees.34 Other abuses have also been documented:
(1) disclosure that an employee (patient) was an alcoholic; (2) sale of
abortion patient names to anti-abortion organizations; (3) extortion
based on knowledge that a patient was treated for venereal disease; (4)
informing an employer of an employee's mental status; (5) disallowance
of health insurance eligibility based on an unconfirmed cancer diagno-
sis;35 (6) an employer requesting a list of HIV-infected employees from
his insurer in order to fire them;36 and the list goes on.37 Because of the
tremendous growth of automated access to private information, these
abuses are likely to increase.
In addition to in-house systems, third-party payers are demanding
more medical information before authorizing payment. New methods of
health care delivery systems, such as preferred provider organizations
(PPOs) and health maintenance organizations (HMOs), require pre-ap-
proval for many kinds of medical treatments. Patients must release their
31. "When certain portions of the medical record are so confidential that extraordinary
means are necessary to preserve their privacy, such as in the treatment of some psychiatric
disorders, these portions may be stored separately." 1 THE 1991 JOINT COMMISSION ON Ac-
CREDITATION OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HosPi-
TALS (1990) [hereinafter JCAH MANUAL].
32. Unlike other lab results which routinely are captured by the computer, the results of
AIDS testing are manually maintained. Only a flag indicating that a test for the HIV virus has
been performed should be entered into the computer according to American Health Informa-
tion Management Guidelines.
33. Conference with Debra Barnhart, Health Care Administrator; Janet Troast, Director
of Medical Records; Eleanor Girard, Manager of Systems and Programming of Scripps Clinic
and Research Foundation in La Jolla, Calif. (Jan. 1988) to discuss possible security measures
to prohibit this kind of activity. Proposals included additional security identification for lab
panels, automatic log off of a computer without any activity for a certain period of time, and
asking computer users not to share passwords with each other.
34. Mike Miller, Data Tap.: Patients' Records are Treasure Trove for Budding Industry,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1992, reprinted in 138 CONG. REC. E2215-04 (daily ed. July 22, 1992).
35. KATHLEEN WATERS & GRETCHEN F. MURPHY, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND COM-
PUTER APPLICATIONS IN HEALTH INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 333 (1983). The last two
abuses listed were releases by insurance companies of medical data obtained by patient consent
for payment purposes.
36. Act to Shield the Privacy of Our Medical Records, USA TODAY, Mar. 27, 1992, re-
printed in 138 CONG. REC. E2215-04 (daily ed. July 22, 1992).
37. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. E2215-04 (daily ed. July 22, 1992) (introduction of The
Prescription Drug Records Privacy Protection Act of 1992).
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medical records before the procedures are authorized. Insurance compa-
nies have created the Medical Information Bureau (MIB), "a computer-
ized subscription service that keeps codes on the health histories of 11
million Americans and Canadians for 700 member insurance compa-
nies."38 This information is available to member insurance companies on
request.39
Federal and state governments also have increased their access to
patient-identifiable health care information. The federal government's
growing involvement in the health care delivery system requires it to con-
trol the cost and quality of many programs. In order to aid governmen-
tal oversight and control mechanisms, as well as to verify payment
claims, the government routinely receives patient-identifiable data.'
Many states require health care providers to report identifiable patient
information to state health agencies. This may include communicable
diseases, violent injuries, health and safety-related diseases and injuries,
and child abuse or neglect.41 Some states require records of abortions,42
certain prescription drugs,43 cancer diagnoses, and cases of battered
adults." Patient-specific data is routinely released to entities outside the
areas of clinical treatment, public health, and insurance. These include
public health agencies, medical and social researchers, rehabilitation and
social welfare programs, employers, educational institutions, courts, law
enforcement agencies, credit investigation agencies, accrediting and certi-
fying agencies, and the media.45
38. BRUCE, supra note 3, at 113.
39. Id.
40. Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the
Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. REV. 255, 260-61 (1984).
41. WESTIN, supra note 5, at 12-13.
42. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80-81 (1976) (uphold-
ing properly confidential recordkeeping and reporting requirements directed at maternal
health). But see Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 766-67 (1986) (striking down detailed abortion reporting requirements because identifica-
tion was the obvious purpose of the requirements).
43. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). In Whalen, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a New York statute requiring that the state be provided with a copy of
every prescription for Schedule II drugs in order to prevent possible abuse. This information is
recorded on magnetic tapes for computer processing. The statute contains security measures
and prohibits public disclosure of patient-identifiable information. Access to the data is lim-
ited to health department and "investigatory personnel."
44. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH RECORDS, HEALTH
RECORDS CONFIDENTIALITY LAW IN THE STATES 2-3 (1979).
45. Gellman, supra note 40, at 261-62.
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C. Future Use and Foreseeable Misuse
In the future, the health care industry's use of computers will be-
come even more intensive: "Advanced computer communications tech-
nology will provide a powerful strategic tool .. . . It will create new
information channels within each health care institution and across the
external boundaries of institutions."46 Physicians will be able to access
medical records from their homes or private offices to "review and evalu-
ate data, and make important patient treatment decisions in a nonpres-
sured environment."47 Consulting physicians may also access the patient
record and "prepar[e] for the case even before the patient is seen." 4 A
shared database between hospitals throughout the country could facili-
tate the continuity of patient care when a patient is transferred from one
hospital to another.49
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) has
been working for many years to "specify and establish a robust and flexi-
ble communications standard for the exchange of data between heteroge-
neous health care information systems."50 Once a communications
standard for health care data is established, technical obstacles to sharing
this data will be eliminated. Hospitals with different computer applica-
tions will be able to communicate with each other. A large medical
databank with thousands of access points can be created.
One commentator envisions regional and national databases of
clinical data made available through computerized networks. These
databanks would "constitute a vast information resource upon which to
base health care policy, clinical studies of effectiveness and appropriate-
ness, equitable reimbursement policies, and scientific hypothesis for fur-
ther research."'" In April 1991, a branch of the National Academy of
Sciences concluded that it was imperative to adopt a computer-based pa-
tient record to provide a uniform standard of information for the medical
record. 
5 2
Establishing a shared database of medical record information be-
comes crucial as the nation evaluates the desirability of a national health
care program. In 1991, the United States spent $751.8 billion, approxi-
mately thirteen percent of its gross national product on health care, up
46. MINARD, supra note 11, at 282.
47. Id. at 284.
48. Id. at 285.
49. Id. at 285-86.
50. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Medical Data Interchange Commit-
tee, IEEE Standards Project # 1157, MEDIX, minutes of Sept. 7, 1988 meeting.
51. Rootenberg, supra note 2, at 168-69. Security measures mentioned in the proposal are
removal or encryption of patient and provider identifiers. Id.
52. Id.
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over eleven percent from 1991 expenditures. 53 Experts estimate that be-
tween $100 billion and $240 billion is directly related to the difficulties
inherent in the administration of a redundant paper-based system.54
The General Accounting Office estimates that a single-payer system
could cut the administrative costs of health care by $67 billion each
year."5 In the "single-payer" or Canadian-style system, discussed at
length in last year's presidential campaign, the government would func-
tion as the sole insurance company. This approach to health care reim-
bursement would eliminate concerns about disclosure of medical record
information to third-party payers, since the need for private health insur-
ance would be eliminated.
Under the Bush Administration, the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) proposed that health care providers be able to
obtain "instant electronic access to a central data base containing the
patient's medical records and insurance-coverage rights."'5 6 HHS esti-
mates that $20 billion could be saved through electronic billing and com-
puterizing patient records. 57 However, such an on-line system is not
likely to be implemented until the end of this decade. The former Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services, Louis Sullivan, said that a major
reason for the delay is concern for maintaining the confidentiality of the
patient medical record. 58 Despite these concerns, HHS is currently set-
ting up a standardized system for billing for Medicaid and Medicare be-
cause no new laws are required to implement the system. 59
Congress has acknowledged the potential savings that automation
can bring to the health care industry. In introducing the Medical and
Health Information Reform Act of 1992, 6 Congressman Horton ex-
pressed an enthusiastic view of what computers will accomplish for the
medical industry:
The legislation ... will produce a system whereby hospital patients
receive a smart card, which, when presented at any hospital, can be
run through a machine to produce all insurance information of the
respective patient. This electronic card system reduces paperwork, in-
53. US. Health Spending Continues Spiral; Exceeded $750 Billion in 1991, HHS Says,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Feb. 1, 1993; see also Rootenberg, supra note 2, at 168.
54. Id.
55. Vicki Kemper & Viveca Novak, What's Blocking Health Care Reform?, COMMON
CAUSE, Jan.-Mar. 1992, at 8, 12.
56. A Plan to Cut Medical Paperwork, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 1991, at A9. See also Paul
Cotton, Proposed Card, Intended to Facilitate Medical Billing, Record Keeping, Draws Mixed
Reviews, 266 JAMA 2804 (1991).
57. Washington Notebook, Life & Health Fin. Services Ed., at 10 (Dec. 9, 1991).
58. Id.
59. Computer System Urged in Medical Care, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 20, 1992, at A9.
60. 138 CONG. REC. E1958-04 (daily ed. June 23, 1992) (introduced by Representative
Horton of New York).
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creases efficiency, makes health care more user friendly, and offers the
potential for dramatic reductions in the more than $60 billion we
spend each year on health care administrative costs alone .... Such a
system would replace today's clipboard and paper with information
age technology. At the push of a button on a hand-held computer, a
doctor would have access to a patient's full medical history .... "61
The proponents of the legislation claim that it would create new federal
standards for privacy and confidentiality of patient information. These
standards are to be promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, the same agency that will be responsible for the efficient admin-
istration of the program.62
Health care reform is a major focus of the Clinton Administration.
The White House Interagency Health Care Task Force is scheduled to
deliver a health care proposal to Congress in May 1993.63 The concept
of "managed competition" is likely to form the basis for the Task Force's
proposal. In this model, health care consumers join large regional
purchasing cooperatives to bargain with health care cooperatives organ-
ized and managed by insurance companies, doctors, and health care in-
stitutions approved and regulated by the federal government. 6  Such
intensively managed systems are likely to be highly dependent on
computers.
Decisions on what information will be needed, not only for the
health of the patient but also for the efficient and robust administration
of the overall program, are a necessary corallary to substantive health
care discussions. A program's design and administration will dictate the
61. Id. But note that the initial costs of automation are likely to be substantial. Short
term costs can be offset by an increase in efficiency that often (but not always) accompanies
automation. However, on a national level, these "short term" costs are likely to be measured
over a decade. The expected reductions in health care administrative costs may not be realized
for many years, especially when accompanied by a large-scale retooling of administrative pro-
cedures and retraining of health care employees.
62. 138 CONG. REC. S8659-04, at 8664 (summary of S. 2878, the proposed Medical and
Health Insurance Information Reform Act of 1992). When information identifies individuals,
the Secretary must "take into consideration" the following principles: (1) information should
be collected only to the extent necessary to carry out the purpose for which the information is
collected; (2) information collected for one purpose should not be used for another purpose
without the individual's informed consent; (3) information should be disposed of when no
longer necessary to carry out the purpose for which it is collected; (4) methods to ensure the
accuracy, reliability, relevance, completeness, and timeliness of information should be insti-
tuted; (5) individuals should be notified, preferably in advance, whether giving the information
is mandatory or voluntary, how the records are maintained, and what uses will be made of the
information; and (6) individuals should be permitted to inspect and correct their own records.
Id.
63. White House Workgroups Scheduled to Pass Fourth Tollgate March 20, BNA PENSION
& BENEFITS DAILY, Mar. 17, 1993.
64. See Dana Priest, A Primer On Managed Competition, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY.
ED., Mar.15-21, 1993, at 33; John B. Judis, Whose Managed Competition?, NEW REPUBLIC,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 20.
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information it requires and how the data will be used. If the federal gov-
ernment or a state becomes the primary insurer, it will receive an enor-
mous amount of personal medical information. If the federal
government funds private insurance, it will require access to this data in
order to exercise effective oversight control. If the managed competition
model is selected, management collectives of insurers, hospitals, and gov-
ernment regulators will review clinical and financial data. In any event,
health care providers will need to provide timely, accurate, and uniform
patient records. Standard, computerized medical records will be the cen-
tral feature in any future health care or health insurance system. 65 In-
deed, a large-scale national health care program will not be feasible
without a standardized, automated medical record.
II
Legal Aspects of Access to Medical Records
A. Hospital Licensing and Accreditation
Hospitals are extensively regulated by all levels of government and
by multiple agencies within each level. In order for a hospital to operate,
it must be licensed by the government.66 Licensure is usually granted by
a state administrative agency which determines the required standards.67
In addition to licensure, many hospitals are also accredited by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH),61 a private organiza-
tion. JCAH includes representatives from a number of medical associa-
tions such as the American Medical Association (AMA), the American
Hospital Association, the American College of Physicians, and the
American College of Surgeons.69 JCAH establishes its own standards7"
that hospitals may voluntarily meet.7 '
Standards established by JCAH have no force of law per se and,
unless action is taken by the courts or the legislature, they do not provide
a standard of care.72 However, in an effort to reduce redundant inspec-
65. See Rootenberg, supra note 2.
66. MILLER, supra note 3, at 41.
67. Id.
68. JCAH is not the only private organization accrediting hospitals. Others include the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the American Osteopathic Association
(AOA). Miller, supra note 3, at 41-42.
69. MILLER, supra note 3, at 41.
70. See JCAH MANUAL, supra note 31.
71. The hospital pays a fee to JCAH and answers a survey to determine whether the
standards established by JCAH are met. MILLER, supra note 3, at 41. JCAH also conducts
on-site inspections of the facility.
72. WILLIAM H.L. DORNETTE, HOSPITAL LIABILITY: LAW AND TACTICS 311 (Mary M.
Bertolet & Lee S. Goldsmith eds., 1980) [hereinafter HOSPITAL LIABILITY].
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tions, several states accept JCAH accreditation as a basis for full or par-
tial state licensure.73 Hospitals accredited by JCAH also meet federal
Medicare requirements for "conditions of participation."74 These volun-
tary standards have been successful in improving the quality of patient
care and preventing negligent conduct.75
The JCAH standards for medical record services state that "[t]he
hospital shall maintain medical records that are documented accurately
and in a timely manner, that are readily accessible, and that permit
prompt retrieval of information, including statistical data."76 Computer-
ized medical record systems can enhance accuracy, timeliness, access,
and retrieval capabilities. The standards also emphasize that medical
records be "confidential, secure, current, authenticated, legible, and com-
plete." '77 No additional standards have been articulated for the comput-
erized medical record.
Furthermore, the standards specify that "[t]he medical record is the
property of the hospital and is maintained for the benefit of the patient,
the medical staff, and the hospital. It is the hospital's responsibility to
safeguard both the record and its informational content against loss, de-
facement, and tampering, and from use by unauthorized individuals."78
Written consent of the patient must be obtained before the medical
records can be released.79 However, this standard specifically does not
require written consent for "use of the medical record for automated
data processing of designated information."80 Therefore, personal medi-
cal information may be entered into a computer system without inform-
ing the patient and without implementing additional standards for its
security. 81
B. Ownership
The patient does not own his medical record 2 but has a recognized
interest in the information it contains.8 3 The hospital owns the physical
73. MILLER, supra note 3, at 42.
74. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395(e) (1982); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1011-.1041 (1984)).
75. HOSPITAL LIABILITY, supra note 72, at 324.
76. JCAH MANUAL, supra note 31, at 30, § MR.I.
77. Id. § MR.3.
78. Id. §§ MR.3.1-MR.3.2.
79. Id. §§ MR.3.3.1-MR.3.3.1.1.
80. Id.
81. But see Rudnik v. Superior Ct., 523 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1974) (holding that information
protected by the doctor-patient relationship does not lose its confidentiality by incorporating it
into a computer record).
82. ROACH ET AL., supra note 19, at 61.
83. Id. at 60.
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record but is just a "custodian of the information." 4 A health care insti-
tution can be held liable to its patients if it discloses medical record infor-
mation improperly or without authorization. 5 The common law bases
recovery on defamation, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract.
8 6
But recovery can be difficult because the patient must show injury in
order to maintain a claim.8 7 In addition, some states provide that the
unauthorized disclosure of medical records is a criminal offense. 8
C. Patient Access Rights
The right of the patient to access her own health records was once a
subject of considerable controversy but now has been affirmed by statute
or case law in many states.89 Patient access to medical record informa-
tion is necessary to correct any misinformation that the record might
contain. In California, for example, every person who is responsible for
his own health care also has a corresponding right of access to informa-
tion regarding that care.90 However, there is no federal right of access 91
and state law varies.92 This lack of access causes problems when patients
seek medical care outside their home states or when data is stored in a
nationwide databank service in a state without access laws.
93
III
The Foundations of the Privacy Interest in the Medical
Record
A. Constitutional Protection
The "right to be let alone," first voiced by Mr. Justice Brandeis in
his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States,94 has its roots in the
84. MILLER, supra note 3, at 292. See also ROACH ET AL., supra note 19, at 60; BRUCE,
supra note 3, at 161.
85. ROACH ET AL., supra note 19, at 59.
86. Id. at 141.
87. Id.
88. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-311 (1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 324-34 (Supp. 1992);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 815 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ch. 395.018 (1992).
89. BRUCE, supra note 3, at 161.
90. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1795 (West 1990).
91. A bill addressing both patient access rights and confidentiality was proposed in Con-
gress in 1979 and 1980. The Federal Privacy of Medical Information Act, H.R. 5935, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) and 2d Sess. (1980).
92. In 1986, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recom-
mended for enactment by the states a Uniform Health Care Information Act. See 132 CONG.
REC. H1625-01 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1986). Only two states, Montana in 1987 and Washington in
1991, have adopted the uniform act. Uniform Health Care Information 1985 Act (West 1992).
93. Ellen Klugman, Comment, Toward a Uniform Right to Medical Records: A Proposal
for a Model Patient Access and Information Practices Statute, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1349 (1983).
94. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
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First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
and in the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty.95 This implicit
constitutional right of privacy has several aspects.
First, an individual has a right to make certain personal decisions
without government interference.96 Individual decisions concerning
marriage, contraception, procreation, family relationships, and raising
one's children97 receive constitutional protection from substantive gov-
ernmental regulation. This "zone of privacy '98 exists when personal
rights are found to be "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty."99
Second, "disclosure privacy' protects "the right of the individual
not to have his private affairs made public by the government."' Dis-
closure privacy refers to the individual's control of personal information
and her ability to select the time, place, and manner in which personal
information is shared with others."0 2 The tradition of civil liberties in
this country, as a general principle, restrains the government from com-
pelling disclosure of certain aspects of private life, especially where rela-
tionships based on trust and confidentiality are involved."0 3 When the
government collects private information- for a specific compelling pur-
pose for the general welfare, it must be held in confidence.", Special
rules concerning confidentiality limit or deny access to other government
agencies.' The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the extra burden
95. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
96. Id.
97. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (right
of privacy is broad enough to include the decision to terminate a pregnancy); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of privacy
encompasses use of contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right of personal
privacy extends to marriage); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (freedom of choice regarding a personal decision in child rear-
ing is constitutionally protected).
98. Roe, 410 U.S. at 219.
99. Id.
100. THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, PRIVACY: PERSONAL
DATA AND THE LAW 1 (1976).
101. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (quoting Philip B. Kurland, The Private I,
U. CHI. MAG. 7, 8 (Autumn 1976)).
102. Id.
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that the collection and automation of personal data has placed on this
aspect of privacy.106
Third, the right to be free from government surveillance of and in-
trusion into one's private life is an important aspect of privacy. The
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures restrains government access to information that the individual
reasonably expects to be kept private.1"7 This protects both paper docu-
ments and electronic signals.108
The unwarranted disclosure of medical record information can vio-
late the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.109 The free-
dom to care for one's health and person is a liberty interest within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 0 A person's interest in his
reputation may also be affected by the release of medical information.11 '
Thus, the control and dissemination of medical information implicates
procedural due process concerns.
Traditionally, the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship has been
highly valued. The principle of confidentiality is prescribed by the Hip-
pocratic Oath"l2 and zealously guarded by the physician." 3 The confi-
dentiality of the doctor-patient relationship optimizes diagnosis and
treatment, I"4 because a person will be more likely to seek treatment if she
knows that the intimate details of her health will be kept confidential. In
106. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605; see also infra notes 167-180 and accompanying
text.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967)
(holding a government search invalid if the individual has an expectation of privacy that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as reasonable). But see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (holding that employee expectations of privacy are diminished in
an industry pervasively regulated to ensure safety when safety depends in substantial part on
the health and fitness of the employee).
108. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
109. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600, 605-06. The Court suggests that the basis of the consti-
tutionally protected "zone of privacy" was narrowed in Roe v. Wade to the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty.
110. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
111. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600 (the right to privacy protects the individual interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (hold-
ing that an interest in reputation is protected by the state by tort law but is not a deprivation of
any liberty or property interest unless it affects a more tangible interest such as employment).
112. "And whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my profession ... if it be what
should not be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets."
MILLER, supra note 3, at 294 (quoting Hippocratic Oath).
113. BRUCE, supra note 3, at 3.
114. MILLER, supra note 3, at 293. In congressional hearings, doctors testified that they
were reluctant to complete the medical chart because they were afraid of violating the Hippo-
cratic Oath. Patients also testified that they withheld information from their physician because
they feared subsequent disclosure. 131 CONG. REC. E240-02 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1985).
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a recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Justice Blackmun recognized this pro-
tected relationship:
In our society, the doctor/patient dialogue embodies a unique relation-
ship of trust. The specialized nature of medical science and the emo-
tional distress often attendant to health-related decisions requires that
patients place their complete confidence, and often their very lives, in
the hands of medical professionals .... It is for this reason that we
have guarded so jealously the doctor/patient dialogue from govern-
mental intrusion. 15
The "right of privacy has no more conspicuous place than in the physi-
cian-patient relationship." '16 Thus, the medical record is protected by
the U.S. Constitution on three levels: the right to be able to make deci-
sions with one's physician concerning medical care and treatment, the
right to control the disclosure of personal medical information, and the
right to be free from government search and seizure of medical facts.
None of these rights, however, has been held to be absolute.11
Compelling state interests can justify regulation of protected activity.' 18
For example, public health concerns can outweigh the private interest in
avoiding disclosure of individual disease; prescription data can be seized
to monitor possible drug abuse; and a national health care program, espe-
cially one that rations certain types of medical treatment, may proscribe
the individual's ability to make, with one's physician, decisions concern-
ing health care.
B. Federal Statutory Protection
Despite the strong tradition of privacy in the medical record and
policy guidelines formulated over twenty years ago, abuses of the privacy
interest in medical information increase with the growing use of com-
puter technology:
Short of the enactment of stringent legislation, now woefully absent...
the health care institution is on its own in protecting the information in
its possession. But as more and more multistate data networks emerge,
mere protection of institutional access codes, no matter how rigorous,
will be insufficient to stem the flow of data across state lines .... Until
severe sanctions are legislated for unauthorized access to records, the
health care institution can only apply its efforts to verifying that its
disclosure practices do not contribute to the flow of information far-
ther and farther beyond its walls.119
115. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 119 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 153-54.
118. Id.
119. BRUCE, supra note 3, at 186-87 n.3. The American Medical Record Association rec-
ommends four technical ways to control unauthorized access: (1) repeated erroneous pass-
words should cause the computer to stop responding to attempts to sign on; (2) computers
should be programmed to delay the unauthorized user until source tracing can be completed;
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Legislation has been proposed in Congress, but thus far none has
been enacted into law.'20  Existing federal and state laws provide only
patchwork protection for personal privacy interests.
The Privacy Act' 2 ' and the Freedom of Information Act 22 were
enacted by Congress in order to provide protection to the individual from
secret government control of private information. Freedom of informa-
tion laws tend to allow access to data previously considered confidential.
On the other hand, privacy laws tend to promote protection of confiden-
tial information. In the context of medical information, these acts apply
to federal institutions and to Medicare and Medicaid programs main-
tained by a federal agency.123 The Privacy Act also applies to insurance
companies acting as intermediaries for the Medicare program 24 and to
hospitals maintaining medical records under a government agency con-
tract.125 Thus, the scope of these acts is limited to information controlled
by the federal government.
The Privacy Act attempts to give private citizens control over the
information collected by the federal government and its use. The Act
requires agencies that gather data on individuals to notify them that the
data is being collected, to explain why it is being collected, and to inform
them whether disclosure is mandatory or voluntary. 26 The Privacy Act
permits an individual access to his own records and the right to correct
such records. 127 If the agency refuses to amend the records, the individ-
ual has a right to administrative review.' 28 But those records may be
(3) an automatic callback procedure should be instituted to telephone the authorized user for
verification; and (4) encryption for data file protection should be developed.
The first suggestion is in widespread use. The second may be difficult to implement be-
cause the computer cannot distinguish an authorized user from an unauthorized one once
access to the system is gained. The callback procedure is time-consuming and impractical
because doctors and their staff are busy and may not be available to take a call. Encryption
might protect against unauthorized copying of files if access protection fails but may be expen-
sive and will not protect against unauthorized on-line access.
120. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. E2215-04 (daily ed. July 22, 1992) (introduction of The
Prescription Drug Records Privacy Protection Act of 1992); 138 CONG. REC. E1958-04 (daily
ed. June 23, 1992) (introduction of The Medical and Health Insurance Information Reform
Act of 1992); 131 CONG. REC. E240-02 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1985) (remarks of Representative
Crane (R-IL) in support of H.R. 74 to provide for the confidentiality of medical and dental
records); The Federal Privacy of Medical Information Act, supra note 91.
121. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1989 & Supp. 1992).
122. Id. § 552.
123. HERMAN SCHUCHMAN ET AL., CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH RECORDS 67 (1982).
124. Id.
125. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m)(1).
126. Id. § 552a(e)(3).
127. Id. § 552a(d).
128. Id. § 552a(b).
19931
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
disclosed without the subject's consent. 129 Employees of the agency that
maintains the record, recipients who provide advance written assurance
that the record will be used in statistical research, U.S. government agen-
cies enforcing civil or criminal law, and persons showing compelling cir-
cumstances affecting the health or safety of an individual may gain access
to government-controlled records. Records may also be disclosed to a
private firm for transcribing, copying, updating, or refining records.1
30
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requires that executive
branch records be made available to any member of the public, except
those records falling within nine exemptions. One exemption category
includes "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy." 13' In order for this exemption to apply, three criteria must be
met: (1) the information must be contained in a personnel, medical, or
similar file; (2) disclosure must be an invasion of personal privacy; and
(3) the severity of invading personal privacy must outweigh the public's
interest in the disclosure. 132 Courts have interpreted the underlying con-
gressional policy of FOIA as one favoring disclosure. 133 This exemption
requires balancing the individual right of privacy against the public's
right to government information. 1
34
C. State Protection
Personal privacy is threatened not only by data collection and reten-
tion by the federal government, but by state government and private
business as well. States have responded to this threat with constitutional
and legislative measures designed to enhance the protection of individual
privacy. The courts interpret these measures narrowly if they find strong
privacy interests in the information contained in the record. If society's
interest in the information outweighs the privacy interest, then these pro-
visions offer little protection to the individual.
129. Id.
130. Id. In the case of disclosure to an individual, notice that this information has been
disclosed must be sent to the last known address of the subject.
131. Id. § 552(b)(6).
132. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1976); DePlanche v.
Califano, 549 F. Supp. 685 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
133. Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Celmis v. U.S. Dept. of Treas-
ury, 457 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 1977).
134. Dept. of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372-73 (1976).
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1. State Constitutional Protection
A minority of the states have explicit privacy rights in their state
constitutions.'35 For example, California voters amended the state con-
stitution in 1972 to create an explicit right of privacy enforceable against
both government and private business.' 36 The ballot measure made it
clear that the amendment was offered in direct response to the growth of
computerized records:
The proliferation of government snooping and data collecting is threat-
ening to destroy our traditional freedoms .... Computerization of
records makes it possible to create "cradle-to-grave" profiles on every
American. At present there are no effective restraints on the informa-
tion activities of government and business .... The right of privacy...
prevents government and business interests from collecting and stock-
piling unnecessary information about us and from misusing informa-
tion gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes ....
Modern technology is capable of monitoring, centralizing and com-
puterizing this information which eliminates any possibility of individ-
ual privacy.
137
One California appellate court concluded that the privacy interest in
one's medical record falls within the scope of this right.1 3 1 However,
California's explicit right of privacy, like the privacy right implicitly em-
anating from the U.S. Constitution, is not an absolute right and must be
balanced against the state interest.'39 Even though the "state of a per-
son's gastro-intestinal tract is as much entitled to privacy from unauthor-
ized public or bureaucratic snooping as is that person's bank account, the
contents of his library or his membership in the NAACP," the state has a
legitimate interest in the quality of health and medical care. 140 Disclo-
sure of the medical record to government entities may be permissible if,
upon strict scrutiny, the court finds that disclosure furthers a compelling
135. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (1972); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (1910); CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1 (1972); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12, 23 (1982); HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 7
(1968, 1978); ILL. CONST. art I, §§ 6, 12 (1970); LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1974); MONT. CONST.
art II, § 10 (1972); S.C. CONST. art I, § 10 (1971); WASH. CONST. art I, § 7 (1889).
136. CAL. CONST. art I, § 1 (1972). See White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34 (Cal. 1975)
(en banc); Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1989). "The argu-
ment's repeated references to information-gathering activities by both government and busi-
ness lead inexorably to the conclusion that the amendment was intended to reach both
governmental and nongovernmental conduct." Id. at 198.
137. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 198 (emphasis added). "Courts have recognized the bal-
lot argument in support of the amendment as its only available legislative history." Id.
138. Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55 (Ct. App.
1979). "A person's medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely more intimate, more per-
sonal in quality and nature than many areas already judicially recognized and protected." Id.
at 60.
139. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 202 (holding an employer may reasonably determine that
the results of a drug test are directly related to job fitness).
140. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
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state interest. 4 1 For private entities, the question is whether the request
for disclosure so substantially burdens the plaintiff's right to privacy as to
make it constitutionally unreasonable. 142 Factors that would tend to
make it permissible are whether a person would anticipate being asked to
disclose medical information (as would an applicant for employment re-
quiring a pre-employment physical), notice that such a release is re-
quired, and whether the procedures are designed to minimize the
intrusion into individual privacy.
1 43
Nevertheless, in a recent case, a California appellate court refused to
order the release of psychotherapy records in a personal injury action.'"
The court held that the privacy provision of Article 1, section 1 of the
California Constitution is self-executing and does not require legislation
in order to create an enforceable right. 145 The court stated that it
thought that "the nature of the material" itself was sufficient to invoke
the right of privacy, although it conceded that some threshold showing
was required. 146 Acknowledging a debt to Justice Stewart, the court ar-
ticulated this standard as: "I know it when I see it."1 147 The court con-
cluded that the petitioner established that the attempt to obtain her
medical records violated her right of privacy. 4  This standard is very
close to asserting that there is an inherent right of privacy in the medical
record.
2. State Legislative Response and Statutory Interpretation
In addition to the federal statutes, several states have enacted their
own freedom of information and privacy acts. For example, California's
Information Practices Act of 1977 declares that the right of privacy is a
personal and fundamental right protected by both the California Consti-
tution and the U.S. Constitution. 49 The legislature found that: "The
right to privacy is being threatened by the indiscriminate collection,
maintenance, and dissemination of personal information and the lack of
effective laws and legal remedies."' 5° This risk to privacy has been
greatly increased by the growing use of sophisticated computer and infor-
141. Id.
142. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
143. Id. at 204.
144. Davis v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331 (Ct. App. 1992).
145. Id. at 334-35. See also White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975) (en banc).
146. Davis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338.
147. Id. (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)) (test for
obscenity).
148. Id. The court noted that it could find no case setting forth, or discussing, the requisite
showing needed to assert a right of privacy. Id.
149. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.1 (West 1990).
150. Id. § 1798.1(a).
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mation technology. 151 This statute applies only to state government
agencies' 52 and forbids the disclosure of personal information unless the
disclosure meets certain conditions.153 The subject of the file has the
right to inspect personal information154 and to request an amendment of
the record.
1 5
In 1981, the California Legislature passed the Confidentiality of
Medical Information Act in order to "provide for the confidentiality of
individually identifiable medical information, while permitting certain
reasonable and limited uses of that information."'5 6 Health care provid-
ers may not disclose patient medical information without authorization.
However, this rule has exceptions. For example, no authorization is re-
quired for disclosure to other providers of health care for diagnosis or
treatment of the patient; to an insurer, employer, or any other person or
entity responsible for payment; to health care facility licensing agencies;
to the county coroner, public health agencies, and clinical researchers;
and to the patient's employer if the information is related to employ-
ment.' 57 Government agencies, among others, are exempt from disclo-
sure limitations if the medical information pertains to any one of a
number of categories, including mental health and developmental disabil-
ities, public social services, communicable diseases, licensing and statis-
tics, workers' safety and industrial accidents, law enforcement, alcohol or
drug abuse, and patient discharge data.'58
Courts in other states have interpreted state statutes to disallow re-
lease of medical record data.'5 9 In an Iowa case involving a patient seek-
ing the identity of a potential blood marrow donor, the court ruled that
151. Id. § 1798.1(b).
152. Id. § 1798.3(b).
153. Id. § 1798.24. Personal information may be disclosed: to the individual to whom it
pertains; with the subject's voluntary written consent; for law enforcement activities; to a gov-
ernmental entity when required by state or federal law; pursuant to the California Public
Records Act, for statistical research if not individually identifiable; in the case of compelling
circumstances that affect the health or safety of an individual with disclosure notification to the
subject at his last known address; to a person subject to a subpoena; for the sole purpose of
verifying and paying government health care service claims; to regulatory agencies for investi-
gations of violations within their purview; to adopted persons for general background informa-
tion pertaining to the adopted person's natural parents, provided the information does not
include or reveal the identity of the natural parents; and to non-profit educational institutions
conducting scientific research with "assurances that the personal identity of the subject shall
not further be disclosed in individually identifiable form." Id.
154. Id. § 1798.34-.35.
155. Id. § 1798.34.
156. Id. § 56.
157. Id. § 56.10(c).
158. Id. § 56.30.
159. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.7.2 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2803-c(3)(f) (McKinney 1993).
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the donor's privacy rights should be protected.16° The plaintiff, a leuke-
mia victim, learned that the University of Iowa's bone marrow registry
included a possible suitable donor. The donor had been tissue-typed be-
cause of an illness in her family and had not consented to having her
name placed in the bone marrow transplant registry. The plaintiff sought
a court order requiring the hospital to identify the woman to enable the
plaintiff to contact her about becoming a donor. The records maintained
in the University of Iowa hospital bone marrow registry were public
records within the meaning of Iowa's public records statue. However,
medical records are confidential under this statute.'61 In addition to the
statutory protection, the Iowa Supreme Court found that a potential do-
nor has a constitutionally based right of privacy in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters.
162
In New York, the highest state court blocked release of the medical
records of twenty-nine women who had abortions, holding that its state
Freedom of Information Law 6 3 did not require disclosure even though
personal identifying data could be deleted.' 61 The court did not discuss
any constitutionally based right to privacy. Instead, it based its holding
on New York statutory law which provided "every patient... the right
to privacy in treatment and in caring for personal needs [and] confidenti-
ality in the treatment of personal and medical records."' 65
IV
Judicial Analysis of the Privacy Interest in the
Medical Record
Whether or not the medical record is automated, courts must bal-
ance an individual's interest in privacy with the community's competing
interest in disclosure. Some commentators have suggested that it is
"foolish" to maintain that there is even a possibility of privacy in a com-
puterized environment. 166 Others argue that public health interests over-
ride the individual's "right to privacy." For example, society's interest in
controlling the spread of AIDS and developing more efficacious treat-
ment may outweigh an individual's interest in preventing the disclosure
that she has the disease (although it may not outweigh the individual's
interest in preventing widespread dissemination of such information). In
160. Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870, 876 (Iowa 1983).
161. Id. at 873.
162. Id. at 876 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)).
163. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW art. 6, § 87 (1977).
164. Short v. Board of Managers, 442 N.E.2d 1235, 1236 (N.Y. 1983).
165. Id. at 1236-37 (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2803-c(3)(0) (McKinney 1993)).
166. BRUCE, supra note 3, at 2.
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health care, thorough analysis of medical data can lead to greater availa-
bility of treatment and enhanced quality of patient care. Further, no one
disputes that the progress made in clinical research has greatly benefitted
society. Now, with the expansion of taxpayer-funded health care, the
public has a greater "need to know" than exists in a private payer system.
The public wants inexpensive high-quality medical care, administrative
efficiency, continued clinical research, and individual privacy. Recent
court decisions reflect these conflicting goals.
A. Whalen v. Roe
In 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe167 unanimously
held that "neither the immediate nor the threatened impact of the pa-
tient-identification requirements ... on either the reputation or the inde-
pendence of patients.., is sufficient to constitute an invasion of any right
or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 16 The New York
legislature had enacted a statute requiring physicians to report to the
state each prescription of certain drugs. The question before the Court
was whether New York could record this identifiable patient data in a
centralized computer file. 169 The Court found that such disclosures were
not significantly different from other necessary but unpleasant intrusions
related to health care. 70 Although the Court did not take special notice
that the required information was limited to only seven basic data ele-
ments,1" 1 it did note that the vast accumulation of personal information
in computer databases might present a threat to privacy.172 But disclo-
sure to authorized health officials of the limited information required by
the New York statute did not "automatically amount to an impermissi-
ble invasion of privacy." 173
Nevertheless, the Court was concerned with the possibility of inap-
propriate disclosure of confidential information. The right to collect per-
sonal information "is typically accompanied" by a duty "to avoid
unwarranted disclosures."' 17' New York State met this duty by imple-
menting measures to secure this data. These security measures included
locking the computer tapes containing the prescription data in a cabinet.
The data was loaded into the computer and processed "off-line." No
167. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
168. Id. at 603-04.
169. Id. at 591.
170. Id. at 602.
171. These seven elements are the prescribing physician, the dispensing pharmacy, the
drug and dosage, and the patient's name, address, and age. Id. at 593.





terminal outside of the computer room could read or record any informa-
tion.175 Only seventeen Department of Health employees had access to
the files. 176 In addition, the statute authorizing the data collection ex-
plicitly prohibited public disclosure of patient identification and provided
that a willful violation was a criminal offense punishable by a jail sen-
tence of up to one year and a $2,000 fine. 17 7 Thus, the Justices were
satisfied that the automated records were adequately protected from de-
liberate or negligent disclosure.
However, the Court did not look closely at the special problems cre-
ated by the use of computer files instead of paper files. For example, the
use of a tape usually involves loading the data into computer memory in
order to optimize processing time. Unless the security procedures in
Whalen also included deleting any files left in memory, locking the tapes
in a cabinet does not prevent programming access and retrieval of the
information. The prescription forms from which the tapes were created
were kept in a vault for five years and then destroyed.17 But there is no
indication how long the magnetic tapes were retained by the state. Most
importantly, there is no indication whether the records could be accessed
only by a unique record identifier, such as a patient medical record
number, or if a collection of records could be retrieved by other variables,
such as the type of drug, the prescribing physician, or the age of the
patient. The programming methods by which the data can be retrieved
and analyzed are as important to consider as the security procedures that
limit access in the first place.
The Court emphasized that it was not deciding a question concern-
ing the unwarranted disclosure of "accumulated private data whether in-
tentional or unintentional or by a system that did not contain comparable
security provision." 179 The Court never intended that its holding in
Whalen be applied without distinguishing different computer systems.
Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, emphasized the troubling role of
centrally-stored data legitimately collected by the state:
Obviously, as the State argues, collection and storage of data by the
State that is in itself legitimate is not rendered unconstitutional simply
because new technology makes the State's operations more efficient.
However, as the example of the Fourth Amendment shows, the Con-
stitution puts limits not only on the type of information the State may
gather, but also on the means it may use to gather it. The central
storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the
potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say
175. Id. at 594.
176. Id. at 595.
177. Id. at 594-95.
178. Id. at 594.
179. Id. at 605-06.
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that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some
curb on such technology.
180
Justice Brennan left open the question whether future use of computer
technology to store sensitive personal data might be unconstitutional
without effective security. It is clear, however, that adequate computer
security measures are required to safeguard the personal privacy interest
in medical record information and protect the data from government
search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. An examina-
tion of "the means" the state may use to gather that information requires
courts to analyze the type of data required, the procedures used to collect
the data, the type of computer system used to store medical data, the
software used to retrieve the data, and the security measures imple-
mented to protect the data.
B. The Abortion Cases
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,8 ' a case
involving disclosure of medical records pertaining to abortion, the U.S.
Supreme Court found that "[r]ecordkeeping and reporting requirements
that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and
that properly respect a patient's confidentiality and privacy are permissi-
ble."' 182 Access to these records was limited to public health officers for
statistical purposes and the records were to be maintained for seven years
by the health care facility. 183
However, in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists,184 another case involving abortion reporting, the Court
found that the state statute did not protect the patient's privacy interest
in her medical record. The scope of the detailed information, its availa-
bility to the public, lack of specific purpose, and the failure of the state to
demonstrate an important health-related interest led the Court to uphold
the confidentiality of the information. 85 Factors such as limited access
and carefully selected data elements are important in this balancing.
When medical records can be accessed by computer, these balancing fac-
tors should be applied more stringently. Unfortunately, the Court in
neither Danforth nor Thornburgh determined whether the data was to be
accessible by computer.
180. Id. at 606-07.
181. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
182. Id. at 80.
183. Id. at 79.
184. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
185. Id. at 765-67 (construing Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, 18 PA. CONST. STAT.
ANN. § 3214(a), (h) (1982)).
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In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,"8 6 the
most recent case involving reporting of abortion-related information, the
Supreme Court recognized that collection of information about actual
patients is an important element of medical research.'87 However, the
Court did not inquire whether the records were accessible by computer
but stated only that the identity of each woman who has had an abortion
remains confidential.' In this day and age, the starting point in deter-
mining whether such records protect the confidentiality of the patient
should be a simple inquiry into the means by which the information can
be accessed.
The district court in Casey noted the required procedures for the
permissible collection and dissemination of this data.'8 9 The Penn-
sylvania Division of Health Statistics and Research is responsible for the
collection, processing, and analysis of data received from health care
providers and has maintained the confidentiality of data other than abor-
tion. g'9° The abortion data are collected on five forms.' 9 ' The person
responsible for the form at the Division enters the data "on her personal
computer" and places the form and computer diskettes in a cabinet that
is to be locked when not in use.' 92 "The computer is password controlled
and only three other persons have the password."'' 93 At the end of every
year, the Statistical Support Section of the Division of Health Statistics
may be given access to the computer records to prepare the annual re-
port. At that level, the same security measures are observed.' 94 The an-
nual reports do not reveal the names of women who have had abortions,
the performing or referring physician, or the facility submitting the
reports.' 95
C. United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 96 the Third Circuit
had to reconcile the privacy interest of employees with the significant
186. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
187. Id. at 2832.
188. Id.
189. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1365 (E.D. Pa.
1990), affid, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
190. Id.
191. Id. The five forms are the Abortion Facility Registration Form, Quarterly Facilities
Report, Report of Induced Termination of Pregnancy, Report of Complications, and Maternal
Death Report.




196. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
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public interest in occupational health and safety. The National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), in the course of con-
ducting a safety investigation of Westinghouse, requested the medical
records of employees potentially exposed to health hazards. Westing-
house refused NIOSH access to the records on the grounds that medical
records are confidential and protected by the employees' right to privacy.
The Third Circuit, citing Whalen v. Roe, I97 found that constitutional
protection of privacy extends to the individual interest in avoiding disclo-
sure of personal matters: a "There can be no question that an em-
ployee's medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal
nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy
protection." 99
NIOSH sought more extensive information than the prescription
data sought in Whalen and, therefore, the information requested fell
within "one of the zones of privacy entitled to protection."' The court
recognized that this right to privacy is not absolute and found that, in
general, reporting requirements have been upheld where the government
has demonstrated a need to acquire personal medical data in order to
ensure the public health.20 I Where disclosure has been allowed, the
court noted that, society's interest in disclosure usually outweighed the
individual's interest in privacy.20 2
The court listed a number of factors used in weighing these compet-
ing interests: (1) the type of record requested; (2) the information it does
or might contain; (3) the potential for harm in subsequent nonconsensual
disclosure; (4) the injury to the relationship generating the information
from the disclosure; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthor-
ized disclosure; and (6) whether there is an express statutory mandate,
articulated public policy, or compelling public interest in disclosure.20 3
The Third Circuit did not review data security procedures, choosing
instead not to disturb the conclusion of the district court which found,
also without analyzing security safeguards, that "the evidence indicates
that NIOSH's procedures of safekeeping the records ... represents suffi-
ciently adequate assurance of non-disclosure."' 2 4 The court found that
NIOSH's security procedures were adequate even though the use of
197. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
198. 638 F.2d at 577.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 578.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (W.D. Pa.), afftd,
638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
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outside contractors for data processing and analysis was planned for
large studies, there were no means to enforce compliance with nondisclo-
sure, and no sanctions for unauthorized disclosure.20 5 The court held
that the strong public interest in the records and the minimal intrusion
into their content justified their release.20 6 However, the court added an
additional protection. It directed NIOSH to give prior notice to all em-
ployees whose medical records it sought to examine. Each employee was
given the right to make an individual judgment about the sensitivity of
her own medical record and an opportunity to object to its release, thus
satisfying procedural due process requirements. Any individual objec-
tions would have to be settled in court on the basis of the particular
claim.20 7 Thus, the Westinghouse court recognized that procedural due
process is required for the release of medical records.
The Third Circuit did not provide any analysis of computer secur-
ity, choosing instead to declare the measures adequate.20 It relied on
giving the subjects of the private records notice and an opportunity to be
heard before disclosure. However, adequate notice cannot be given if the
patient is not made aware of the possibility of widespread dissemination
of the data, as in this case, to outside data processing consultants. Notice
to patients should include a description of how and where the data is to
be used, as well as to whom it will be disclosed and for what purpose. In
addition, where access to information is readily available, it will be im-
possible to provide due process-that is, notice before the disclosure is to
be made-without adequate security safeguards.
D. Peninsula Counseling Center v. Rahm
In Washington State, three mental health treatment centers and two
patients sought to restrain the Department of Social and Health Services
from implementing an automated auditing and tracking system. The sys-
tem tracked mental health clients' participation in any mental health
services or public program. 20 9 The court refused to restrain the system,
stating that there was no general constitutional right to privacy. 210 It
relied on Whalen for the proposition that the disclosure of the patient's
name did not raise privacy interests to a constitutional level even if it
intruded into a doctor/patient relationship or deterred some patients
from obtaining medical treatment.211
205. 638 F.2d at 580.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 581-82.
208. Id. at 582.
209. Peninsula Counseling Ctr. v. Rahm, 719 P.2d 926, 927 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
210. Id. at 928.
211. Id. at 928-29.
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The court recognized that more intrusive procedures could violate
this privacy interest in the medical record but found that this system
contained adequate security. These measures included encoding patient
identification, carefully selecting data elements, limiting access to the raw
data to only a few officers, and civil penalties for unauthorized disclosure.
The court held that even though more protective measures were sug-
gested by the plaintiffs, the state did not have to utilize more cumber-
some procedures.212 The Washington Supreme Court enumerated the
elements it thought important to protect patient privacy, such as encryp-
tion of patient identity213 and careful selection of data elements. How-
ever, the court declined to impose simple additional procedures that
would have enabled the system to be even more secure.21 4
The dissent, envisioning government-controlled "womb-to-tomb"
computer dossiers on each individual, maintained that "the best way to
prevent government abuse is to preclude the government from collecting
the information in the first place."' 215 Despite the strong stand against
the collection of data by the government and alarmist references to
"Orwellian psychology," Senator Thomas Eagleton, and "record prison
psychology, ' 216 the dissent proposed a balancing test in which the state,
should its interest in the confidential information outweigh the individ-
ual's interest in privacy, bears the burden of proving that it used the least
intrusive means available to meet its interest.21 7 Since the government
did not meet this burden, the dissent stated that it would have found that
the mental health tracking system violated the state's constitutional right
to privacy which is more protective than the federal constitutional pri-
vacy interest articulated by Whalen.218
212. Id. at 929-30. The plaintiffs had suggested encoding the patient identifying data at the
individual health centers instead of at the central data processing location.
213. Encryption of patient identity might not be adequate to protect the confidentiality of
computer records. Computer searches do not have to be performed by retrieving the record by
its unique identifier. Database retrieval permits searches of patient records by attributes. For
example, instead of asking the computer to pull John Doe's record, a computer user can ask it
to find all male patients between the ages of twenty and twenty-five who reside in a certain zip
code area and who are being treated for drug dependency.
214. Id. at 929-30.
215. Id. at 933.
216. Id. at 931-33. Senator Thomas Eagleton was forced to withdraw as the 1972 Demo-
cratic party vice presidential candidate after his earlier psychiatric treatment was publicly
revealed.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 932, 937.
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E. Stone v. City of Stow
In Stone v. City of Stow,2" 9 the Ohio Supreme Court held that al-
lowing police officers to investigate prescription records of local pharma-
cies in six local communities did not violate any constitutionally
protected privacy interest. 220 The program allowed the police to collect
data on certain target drugs that could be resold on the illegitimate mar-
ket. Local police officers assisted the Ohio State Board of Pharmacy in
monitoring pharmacies and collecting data. The police obtained the data
primarily by copying pharmacy files by hand or from computer printouts
supplied by the pharmacies. 221 This data was then again manually input
on the local police station's personal computer and copied to floppy disk.
A police lieutenant collected the diskettes and took them to the central
records system located in the Stow police station. There, the information
contained on the diskettes was loaded into the central computer, and the
floppy disks were erased.222 The court noted that the parties stipulated
that nine investigations under this program had produced six arrests, re-
sulting in five convictions and one "pretrial diversion. "223
The Ohio Supreme Court relied on Whalen for the proposition that
only a limited privacy right exists in medical information and, where
there are sufficient safeguards, there is no infringement of this limited
right. The court declined to balance the privacy interest in medical pre-
scription data against the government's interest in access to these records
because the individual's privacy rights, within the limits of Whalen, ap-
ply only against disclosure to the general public and not against disclo-
sure to the government. 224 The court refused to consider that the threat
of unauthorized disclosure was greater in this case than in Whalen, stat-
ing that the threat of unauthorized disclosure was present in Whalen and
did not cause the New York statute to be declared unconstitutional.225
The provisions of the Ohio Administrative Code curtail police officers'
access to these records by limiting them to a designated person or
drug. 226 No Fourth Amendment violation existed because physicians
219. 593 N.E.2d 294 (Ohio 1992).
220. Id. at 297-99.
221. The Ohio Supreme Court sanitizes this collection process: "The collected data are
entered by each community onto computer floppy disks .... The disks are erased and returned
to each participating community." Id.
222. Stone v. City of Stow, C.A. No. 14691, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 390, at *9-10 (9th
App. Dist. Jan. 31, 1991).
223. 593 N.E.2d at 296.
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and patients have no reasonable expectation of privacy in prescription
records.227
The Ohio Supreme Court's analysis of data security illustrates the
danger of relying on Whalen to justify completely different methods of
data processing. The Stone court's analysis is completely inadequate. Se-
curity procedures could have been improved from the point of collection
to the purported erasure of the data. Double'copying of the data (manu-
ally and by data entry) not only increases the risk that the data will be
erroneous but also exposes the data to additional persons. The use of
multiple computers increases the possibilities of both accidental disclo-
sure and intentional violation of confidentiality. Carting around floppy
disks in a police car between multiple sites further exposes the data to
misplacement, loss, or theft. Erasing floppy disks without erasing the
same information on the local police station's computer does not elimi-
nate the potential problem of duplicate data sets. The threat of criminal
sanctions for disclosure is not likely to be pressed against law enforce-
ment officers carrying out their official duties. Putting aside the Fourth
Amendment question of the propriety of using police officers instead of
health officials to review prescription records, additional technological
safeguards could have been implemented to help protect the privacy in-
terest in the medical information.
F. Whalen Revisited
Whalen v. Roe 228 provides the benchmark by which other cases in-
volving the potential disclosure of computerized medical information are
decided. These cases illustrate the variation in the application of the
Whalen standard that the courts use to determine whether the privacy
interest in confidential information has been adequately protected. But
Whalen was decided before personal computers were available and
should not be applied to personal computers, networks, or on-line main-
frame systems. Although the security goals are the same, the widespread
familiarity with the personal computer, ease of access, portability of data,
and the availability of analysis tools expose the data to greater risk of
disclosure, both inadvertent and intentional. Today, security analysis
must begin with the creation of the source documents and end with an
analysis of the measures used to protect the data at all its ultimate
destinations.
The courts should consider a systematic test to ensure that their
analysis of computer security is complete. First, courts should acknowl-
227. Id. at 301.
228. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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edge that the individual has an inherent and traditional privacy interest
in her medical information.229
Second, the public interest in disclosure should be clearly identified
pursuant to existing statute or public policy.
Third, the specific information necessary to satisfy the public inter-
est should be identified. The reports that will be generated using this
data should be described and their relationship to furthering the public
interest should be explained.
Fourth, the least intrusive measures to collect the data elements
should be determined and evaluated in terms of both privacy and, for
government-controlled collection systems, the Fourth Amendment pro-
hibition against unreasonable search and seizure.
Fifth, the adequacy of computer security safeguards should be ana-
lyzed by asking: Who has access to the data? What is the risk of inad-
vertent disclosure? What protection has been implemented to thwart
intentional security breaches? Does the system track inquiries and infor-
mation retrievals so that a violation can be detected?
Sixth, courts should refuse to approve systems if they find the secur-
ity to be inadequate.
Seventh, only after the court has ascertained the privacy interest
that an individual can expect in an automated system should the court
engage in balancing the public need for the information against the indi-
vidual's interest in confidentiality.
And finally, when federal or state government requests data that is
extremely sensitive, courts should follow the example of United States v.
Westinghouse23° and satisfy due process by providing notice and an op-
portunity to be heard prior to the release of the medical record.
V
Beyond the Courts: Defining and Implementing Public Policy
Medical privacy experts call for a public policy balancing the pa-
tient's personal privacy interest, the health care institution's interest in
efficiency, and society's interest in medical research.231 In order to meet
their expectation of privacy in confidential medical data, patients should
have an enforceable qualified right to review and copy their own records,
an opportunity to correct erroneous entries, and the ability to place limi-
229. Not only courts, but also the executive and legislative branches of government (espe-
cially in view of a national health care system) should make an explicit legal commitment to
the privacy of medical information. For a proposal for a general legal commitment to privacy,
see Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980).
230. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
231. Hiller & Beyda, supra note 25, at 481-82.
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tations on access to records and files. The duty of confidentiality in the
physician-patient relationship should be extended to medical information
stored in a computer system. Patients should receive notice of subpoenas
for their medical records served on the health care institution. Detailed
public procedures should be available by which patients can challenge
the contents of their records.232
To protect the interest of health care institutions, guidelines for ex-
punging obsolete data should be defined. Health care institutions should
be able to provide abstracted or summarized data to other organizations
rather than releasing the complete medical record. Rules for sharing
data between institutions should be enforced and record ownership clari-
fied. Data security systems need to be developed that include the assign-
ment of administration and security to specific individuals and all
employees must be informed about the legal consequences of breaches of
confidentiality.233
To protect society's interest in the availability of medical informa-
tion, patients should be notified of the identity of the recipient of the
medical data. The policy of informed consent should be extended to pa-
tient authorization to release the medical record for non-health care use,
such as insurance and medical research. An ethical code of conduct
should be developed for all personnel collecting and maintaining com-
puter records. Public notice describing the computer system for each
institution should be given to each patient.234
232. Id. at 481.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 481-82. See also WATERS & MURPHY, supra note 35, at 354-55. The authors
list ten principles of data security privacy.
1. Any person should be able to inspect his own file maintained by agencies or firms
and have copies made at a reasonable cost.
2. Any person should have the right to supplement the information in his personal
data file.
3. A method should be established to allow for the removal of erroneous or irrele-
vant information and provide that agencies, organizations, and persons to whom ma-
terial had been previously transferred, be notified of its removal.
4. The disclosure of information in a personal data file to individuals in agencies or
organizations other than those who need to examine the file in connection with their
duties should be prohibited.
5. A dissemination record should be maintained to identify all persons inspecting
such files including their identity and their purpose.
6. Agencies or firms maintaining personal data files should ensure that the informa-
tion be maintained completely and competently with adequate security safeguards.
7. Agencies or firms collecting data from individuals must apprise them if the re-
quest is mandatory or voluntary and what penalty or loss of benefit will result from
noncompliance.
8. It should be required that personnel involved in handling personal information
act under a code of fair information practices, know the security procedures, and be
subject to penalties for any breaches.
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Legal effect should be given to the following principles as recom-
mended by the Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Advisory Com-
mittee on Automated Personal Data Systems: (1) there must not be
computerized record keeping systems of personal data whose very exist-
ence is secret; (2) an individual must be able to find out what information
is kept about him and how it is used; (3) there must be a method by
which an individual can prevent personal information collected for one
purpose from being used for another purpose without his consent; (4)
personal information must be able to be corrected or amended by the
individual it concerns; and (5) the reliability of data must be protected by
the organization maintaining and using the information and the organi-
zation must take precautions to prevent misuse of data.235
On the technical side, medical records system software must include
the following features: (1) security systems must allow authorized users
timely and simple access to data; (2) unauthorized users must not be able
to access data; (3) unauthorized access attempts must be reported imme-
diately to a designated computer operator; (4) a record must be main-
tained of all unsuccessful attempts to gain access; and (5) system users
should be identified by category and by allowable functional
operations.2 36
Information technology has developed much faster than human un-
derstanding of its implications. In order to prevent access to sensitive
information by unauthorized persons, every piece of information that is
entered into a medical information system must be identified and its itin-
erary must be mapped. For example, when a diagnosis is entered, medi-
cal administrators know that the health care staff will need access to it, as
well as other departments such as admissions, utilization review, billing,
dietary, medical review groups, researchers, and in aggregate, the depart-
ments of finance and administration. Outside the institution, the diagno-
sis may be sent to insurance companies, record abstracting services, and
9. Any individual wishing to stop receiving mail sent because his name is on a
mailing list should have the right to do so.
10. Agencies or organizations should be prohibited from requiring individuals to give
their social security numbers for any purpose not related to their social security ac-
counts or not mandated by federal statute.
235. SCHUCHMAN ET AL., supra note 123, at 161.
236. WATERS & MURPHY, supra note 35, at 341-43. Procedural and practical protections
for computer security include: monitoring all inquiries; establishing user files, the use of pass-
words, the use of fingerprints, voice prints, signatures, and retina prints to authenticate user
identity; blocking data paths that can be exploited by unauthorized persons; refusing to answer
a statistical query when there are fewer than three individuals in a category; and substituting
individual codes for patient names for researchers who may not access names without addi-
tional approval. See also John T. Soma & Richard A. Wehmhoefer, A Legal and Technical
Assessment of the Effect of Computers on Privacy, 60 DENV. U. L. REV. 449 (1983).
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possibly multiple state and federal agencies. The level of access is high
and the need for security relatively low. In addition to user-specific and
function-specific security, each data element should be secured according
to its sensitivity and the need to access it. On-line panels should have the
capability to blank out identified data elements depending on the user
requesting the data. If certain diagnoses are deemed sensitive, inadver-
tent disclosure may be avoided.
Also, it is now technologically feasible to track inquiry and access to
data elements. Every health care provider, including the government,
should be required to maintain files identifying the requester and the pur-
pose of the inquiry. Those accessing health care records should be made
aware that their inquiries are being tracked. The computer can record
when data is downloaded or transferred out of the institution. This in-
formation can be used to track incorrect data to provide an opportunity
to correct it. It will also provide a complete utilization picture. Trans-
fers made by "sneakerware ' 2 37 between personal computers should be
discouraged unless a central software application has been developed for
authorizing and tracking data transfers.
VI
Conclusion
Twenty years ago, Alan Westin, perhaps the foremost authority on
computer privacy in the United States, wrote:
[T]he civil liberties issues raised by uses of computers are not matters
of information security to be resolved by technical specialists but are
instead policy choices as to privacy, confidentiality, and due process.
Thus, no technological fix can be applied to the databank problem ....
[S]ocial policy must precede technique, and our discussion ... registers
such a priority for the social, legal, and administrative problems.238
Today, it is evident that social policy has preceded technique-by de-
cades. If we still wish to protect our privacy interests in the medical
record, the same technology that threatens our security239 must be used
to preserve it.
237. Sneakerware involves taking a diskette from one personal computer and running it
over to another.
238. WESTIN & BAKER, supra note 103, at 392.
239. See Sandra G. Boodman, Bringing Abortion Home, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY. ED.,
Apr. 19-25, 1993, at 6, 7. The article details how anti-abortion groups gathered information
about Dr. David Gunn, murdered in March 1993 by an anti-abortion protester:
We get people in the hospital who know the doctor's schedule and can get a [com-
puter] printout, which gives you a lot of stuff: the name, address and phone number
of the woman, the gestational age of the baby, how many abortions the doctor per-
forms a week. That's how we found out about Gunn.
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Advances in information technology can pave the way for the imple-
mentation of public policy. But technology without clear policy goals
cannot serve the public interest. And policy goals, however clearly delin-
eated, cannot insure that health care providers, insurance agencies, and
federal and state government respect this privacy interest at the expense
of their own ease and efficiency of operation. Maintaining security for
confidential computerized records requires a total integration of ethics,
policy, procedure, and technology.
As Justice Brennan suggests, curbs on computer technology may be
necessary. 24° However, this does not have to take the form, as some
wish, of a blanket prohibition on the use of modem technology. Rather,
when computers are used to capture, store, and analyze medical record
information, the courts should apply data security principles to its pri-
vacy analysis. The courts should insist upon the implementation of con-
comitant technology that can better protect the traditional privacy
interest in the medical record. But this determination is dependent upon
a balancing of the public need for the medical information and the pri-
vate interest in its confidentiality. This balancing test will probably be
dramatically altered, not by the courts but by democratic political
processes, in this decade.
The courts are restrained by constitutional and prudential limita-
tions to interpret and apply the law, not to create it. It will be very
important in the years to come, "if the right of privacy is to exist as more
than a memory or a dream,"24' to define the individual and community
interests in private medical information. This nation has the best oppor-
tunity yet to do so as we develop a national health care delivery system
and the technology that will be necessary to implement it effectively, eco-
nomically, and with the greatest respect for the right of the individual
"to be let alone."
240. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
241. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Co., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 204 (Ct. App. 1989).
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